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1 Introduction
We know that, in poorer countries, effective public
services are vital for poverty reduction. Episodes of
ill-health, often caused by poor water quality or
sanitation and lack of access to good healthcare, are
a major reason why people fall into poverty.
Education appears to be the single most important
route for exiting poverty (Krishna 2007). In most
countries, the responsibility for adequate provision of
such basic services lies with the state. Yet state-
provided public services often fail poor people. When
poor people turn to an unregulated private sector to
access services, they are hit twice – they frequently
pay more than the better-off for services that are
often of poorer quality.
The recent adoption of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) by industrialised countries has served
to focus the attention of the development
community on the constraints to universal coverage.
While lack of adequate funding is part of the
problem for some countries, the main problem lies in
the inability of institutions to deliver for a wide
variety of structural reasons, including lack of
adequately trained personnel, lack of authority at
lower levels of government, corruption and
inadequate incentives for improving performance in
public agencies. Consequently, there is some
consensus that public sector reform is part of any
strategy to improve public service delivery. At the
same time, there is no consensus on the best means
to organise institutions for the delivery of public
services. Among the various attempts at public
sector reform, three broad trends stand out –
pluralisation, decentralisation and institutionalised
participation. While there are different ideological
bases for proposing each of these reforms, they can
be grouped under two broad categories: what one
might call ‘choice’ reforms that are underpinned by
market mechanisms and ‘voice reforms’ that seek to
strengthen accountability mechanisms.
This article argues that the key to understanding the
potential of accountability mechanisms for improving
service delivery are the processes through which
collective actors engage over time with the state in
shaping policy. When collective actors participate in
service delivery reforms, they are more likely to
engage in social accountability actions that monitor
reform implementation as well as increase the
uptake of reforms by people.
To make this argument, this article draws upon an
approach which focuses on the iterative processes of
state–society interaction through which the nature
and capacity of state and collective actors are shaped:
the polity approach. Polity-centred analyses suggest
that the way state institutions are organised will
influence who engages in collective action and
around what types of issues (Skocpol 1992;
Houtzager 2003). Reforms of the state – including
pluralisation, decentralisation and institutionalised
participation – can have significant impacts on the
incentives faced by potential collective actors. By
tracing who participates at foundational moments of
policy changes, we can see how the reform process
enables some actors to ‘engineer’ an ‘institutional
fit’, while constraining others (Houtzager 2003).
The recent literature on social accountability provides
a good analytical frame to see the ways in which
collective actors can hold states to account through
non-electoral mechanisms (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
2006). While this literature offers promising insights
into the conditions under which social accountability
is likely to be successful and the mechanisms through
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which it operates, it has said less about who engages
and why collective actors demand social
accountability under some conditions and not others.
To understand the processes through which social
accountability emerges and is sustainable, we need
to analyse the impact of recent changes in state
institutions on collective actors and trace the
dynamics of their involvement with the state in
policy reforms, implementation and subsequent
efforts at sustaining social accountability.
The argument unfolds in the following fashion. The
next section traces the logic of the recent reforms of
the state that have moved from the ‘choice’
dominated reforms of the new public management
to a focus on accountability as exemplified by the
World Development Report 2004 (World Bank 2003).
Section 3 outlines why the social accountability
approach represents an advance on thinking about
accountability and highlights some of the theoretical
and empirical issues it raises. Section 4 shows how
taking a polity approach to understanding the
involvement of collective actors in social
accountability might help highlight the conditions
under which social accountability is likely to emerge
and be effective. Section 5 concludes by outlining a
research agenda shaped by such a polity approach.
2 Service delivery reforms
2.1 Emphasising choice: new public management
reforms
Not long ago, in the 1990s, as a part of the wave of
state reforms, new public management (NPM) was
viewed as the solution to improve public sector
performance in service delivery (Hood 1991).
Underpinning NPM was a diagnosis of the problems
of the public sector based in public choice theory.
Rent-seeking public officials with little incentives to
act in the ‘public interest’ were unlikely to pay
attention to improving performance. Subjecting
them to the pressures of the market or market-like
mechanisms, it was assumed, would give them the
right kind of incentives. Techniques well developed in
the management of private enterprises – contracting
out, performance-based contracts, the creation of
autonomous agencies, separation of policymaking
from implementation, user fees, citizen charters and
technology-driven complaint mechanisms – were
applied to the public sector to various degrees (Hood
1991). Unfortunately, there has been little systematic
research that traces these public sector reforms
through to their impact on the quality of service
delivery. And there is little evidence to show that
these techniques worked in the complex social and
political environments of developing countries
(Manning 2001; Polidano 2001).
One of the key reforms implied by NPM was the
creation of competition through the pluralisation of
services enabling users to exercise ‘choice’.
Pluralisation is expected to increase choice by
increasing the number of providers and the variety of
services they provide. Pluralisation also entails the
separation of policymaking and provision, thus
increasing the ability of policymakers to sanction
poor performance by providers. Decentralisation and
the privatisation of services often accompany
pluralisation. By allowing state and non-state
providers to flourish at the local level, the market is
expected to cater to a greater diversity of needs,
allowing users to choose providers that best meet
their needs in terms of price and quality.
Demand-side mechanisms, such as vouchers that
stimulate competition between providers, are
commonly used alongside pluralisation to improve
service performance. These involve the channelling
of resources directly to households or third party
institutions responsible for securing services for a
defined group of people who can then choose the
best provider. The advantages of such approaches is
that they ensure resources reach intended
beneficiaries and they strengthen institutions that
can influence providers to perform better (Standing
2004). In Bangladesh for example, under a
government programme, the provision of stipends
for girl scholars has improved their enrolment in
schooling, enabled families to choose which schools
they attend and reduced drop out rates (GHK 2005).
While such programmes provide incentives for poor
families to prioritise education and choose their
preferred facility, they also, by increasing choice,
create incentives for providers to respond and
strengthen the power of users vis-à-vis.
A large part of these reforms developed under the
rubric of NPM were of a managerial nature, largely
intended to improve public services by changing the
incentives faced by providers. The impact of choice
on basic services is assumed to work through the
invisible hand of the market; no further action on the
part of the state or users is necessary. There have
been many criticisms of this choice strategy as a
means to improve services – in many places there is
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no effective competition and users do not have
adequate information about the true quality of
services.
2.2 Emphasising voice – accountability reforms
More recently however, greater attention is being
focused on the lack of accountability mechanisms
between users and public service providers. The
analysis of the World Development Report of 2004
entitled ‘Making Services Work for the Poor’
exemplifies this focus on accountability (World Bank
2003). The central argument is that accountability
relationships between the key stakeholders in service
delivery – citizens, policymakers and service providers
– are not transparent, formalised or effective. This,
the report argues, leads to a whole host of problems
that plague services – inadequate spending on basic
public services, the skewing of service provision
towards the rich, inadequate coverage particularly
for the poorest people, lack of resources at the point
of delivery, corruption, absenteeism of staff and
ultimately poor quality of services.
The problem is evident in three sets of relationships
between the key actors. First, mechanisms to ensure
that governments adopt policies that meet the
needs of their citizens (including the poorest ones)
are weak. Politicians simply do not have incentives to
improve service delivery when political institutions
enable them to win and retain power by appealing
to religion, caste or ethnicity rather than
developmental performance. Citizens have few
channels to be heard other than through the ballot
box. The lack of information on the performance of
politicians, social fragmentation along religious and
ethnic lines and a lack of credibility among the
population about political promises, creates a climate
in which there are few incentives for politicians to
focus on improving services (Keefer and Khemani
2003; Batley 2004).
Policymakers in turn do not have effective ways of
holding service providers accountable. This can be a
particularly acute problem when providers are part
of the state itself (as is common in many countries
where services are directly provided by the state) and
there is little transparency or clarity in the state’s
expectations and providers’ responsibilities.
Horizontal channels of accountability – through the
legislature or public institutions such as ombudsmen
– have largely failed to oversee the work of
providers. Finally, in most polities there are few
mechanisms for citizens to hold service providers
directly accountable for service delivery.
Thus, the debate has shifted from managerial
reforms to a focus on the potential for abuse of
power and position by politicians, public officials and
providers (public or private) and the importance of
empowering end-users in a countervailing fashion.
As the ‘long route’ of accountability has failed (from
citizens electing policymakers who fail to check
providers), greater emphasis is being placed on the
‘short route’ of accountability (directly between
citizens and providers) (World Bank 2003).
This has resulted in reforms such as institutionalising
direct user participation and decentralisation, which
are expected to improve voice and consequently
provider responsiveness (Mallick 2006). A variety of
mechanisms to strengthen voice are now commonly
advocated: formal computerised complaint systems,
single window cells, and citizen charters are being
used to increase the ability of users to interact easily
and directly with providers. In Hyderabad, India, toll-
free complaint numbers installed by Metro Water
(the semi-autonomous water authority) have been
used successfully to log complaints as well as a
management tool to improve frontline employee
performance (Caseley 2003). Streamlining of the
complaint system for all urban services in Mumbai by
a non-governmental organisation (NGO)-initiated
and managed information system has been successful
in reducing the time taken to resolve complaints as
well as to hold responsible departments accountable
(PRAJA 2000).
Yet many of these efforts are focused on the
individual consumer. This is problematic for three
reasons. First, these mechanisms largely focus on
people as ‘consumers’. They often do not leave space
for the claims of those (particularly the poor) who
are not served at all by providers. Second, despite
the creation of direct channels for reaching
providers, it is not clear why users would use them if
there is no mandate (and related sanctions) for
providers to respond. We know that there are high
transaction costs for exercising voice, particularly for
poor people, and without credible sanctions for lack
of responsiveness, such tools lack bite. Third, these
mechanisms largely place responsibility on individuals
to invoke accountability against providers. It is
however not clear that, even if adequate incentives
existed for poor citizens to engage and make claims,
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individual citizens will be able to do so. In fact, there
is little evidence to suggest that individual citizens in
poor communities are effective agents in holding
either public or private providers to account and
securing greater responsiveness. Rather, as the next
section highlights, collective action is essential for
the poor if direct accountability is to work.
3 Social accountability
The recent literature on social accountability has
focused on the ways in which social actors can hold
governments and politicians directly accountable
through mechanisms other than elections (Peruzzotti
and Smulovitz 2006; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000;
Ackerman 2005). Traditional forms of political
accountability – vertical mechanisms such as elections
and horizontal mechanisms such as institutional
checks and balances – have often failed to ensure an
effective watch on the use of public authority. In
response, a number of social movements have
emerged that demand accountability through other
channels – what is now being called ‘social
accountability’.
Social accountability differs from traditional
accountability in three main ways. First, in contrast to
traditional accountability, social accountability is
expected to be more effective because it works in the
period between elections using both institutional and
non-institutional channels. Przeworski (2006: 329)
attributes the rise of social accountability to the
declining role of political parties to respond to the
populace, having lost their ‘socially integrative
functions’. Second, rather than the limited conception
of community mobilising for narrow self-interests in
electoral politics, social accountability actors seek to
institutionalise durable societal control over policies by
enabling collective actors to exercise voice in
deliberative processes that monitor public decisions.
Thus, social accountability agents are not pressure
groups or interest groups in the traditional sense that
lobby for particularistic benefits. Rather, they often
demand accountability for activities that are already
sanctioned by the law. Unlike lobbying groups or
corporatist organisations, their actions are within the
public domain. In fact, they use the public domain to
highlight issues, bring to bear on reputations and gain
broader political support. Because of these reasons,
collective actors working for social accountability
often frame their claims in terms of legality and
rights. Consequently, social accountability is expected
to work through three main strategies – social
mobilisation, the judiciary and the media (Peruzzotti
and Smulovitz 2006). In some countries, the newly
created spaces for institutionalised participation in
governance have been used for social accountability
(Fung and Wright 2003; Cornwall and Coelho 2006).
In addition, pressures generated through social
accountability can activate traditional horizontal
accountability mechanisms. Finally however, social
accountability differs from traditional accountability
mechanisms in that it is not mandatory. Losers in
elections have to concede power. Those who are
targets of social accountability strategies are not
required to concede; it is assumed that the force of
media, public debate, reputational damage and the
triggering of traditional accountability mechanisms
will have the intended effects.
Social accountability thus offers a useful analytical
frame for understanding ways through which
services might be improved through collective action.
However, different scholars emphasise different
elements of social accountability – for example,
whether they are procedural or outcome related.
Goetz and Jenkins (2004) emphasise that the new
social movements for accountability are focused on
outcomes of public actions, and not as much on the
appropriateness of procedures followed. Others
focus on procedural deviations in the workings of
government and highlight corruption. Moreover,
social accountability measures can be retrospective
(social audits) or prospective (budget analysis).
Furthermore, much of the literature from Latin
America has focused on social accountability in the
area of civil and political rights (Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz 2006), whereas in other parts of the
world, it is social and economic rights that are at the
forefront of the social accountability agenda.
While these varying emphases are largely a matter of
strategic choice based on the countries and contexts
in question, there are two fundamental issues on
which scholars differ that deserve attention for
analytical reasons.
3.1 Social accountability vs. deliberative
institutions
Most importantly, there is a need to distinguish
between social accountability and deliberative
(decision-making) institutions. In social accountability,
there is necessarily a reasoned account either of past
behaviour or promises of future action. But social
accountability by itself does not presuppose
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participation in decision-making. Some authors
separate the monitoring functions from the decision-
making functions, suggesting that social accountability
is exercised when ordinary people monitor the use of
public authority and, through social mobilisation that
invokes the law and uses media campaigns, demand
explanations when government actions deviate from
what is expected (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006;
O’Donnell 2006). Other authors treat fora for direct
deliberative decision-making as being part of social
accountability institutions (Arroyo 2004; Malena et al.
2004). Yet others view the relationship between
social accountability and deliberative institutions as an
empirical question, asking how the existence of
particular spaces for participation impact on citizen
engagement, inclusion and deepening democracy
(Cornwall and Coelho 2006; Fung and Wright 2003).
Analytically, it makes sense to separate these two
ways of participating in the exercise of public
authority for they have different implications for
when social accountability initiatives are likely to
emerge and how they operate (Table 1). It is evident
that some participatory institutions are stronger at
creating spaces for citizen involvement in public
policy decisions (participatory budgeting) than others
that do better at monitoring government action
(social audits). It would be a mistake to assume that
institutions are able to perform well on both
dimensions; yet it is precisely such institutions that
are of most interest to us.
Part of the reason for this is that there is a tension
between whether social accountability institutions
are autonomous from the state or not. Often the
credibility of social accountability activities depends
upon collective actors distancing themselves from
the state, the actions of which they are questioning.
If such actors are simultaneously part of deliberative
decision making, they could be accused of
cooptation by the state and thus lose legitimacy and
effectiveness.
A related point is the issue of alliances that cut
across the public–private divide. Implicit in the use of
social accountability strategies is the fact that
collective actors need to have relevant information
that enables them to bring to light corruption,
distortion or bias in public spending. Yet, given the
confrontational nature of accountability demands, it
is unlikely that the information is willingly conceded
by the state. At the heart of social accountability
strategies are alliances formed across the
public–private divide, which enable societal actors to
gain leverage (through information, access, etc.) vis-
à-vis the state. These can occur through societal
actors occupying the state over time (as in the case
of health policy in Brazil, see Dowbor, this IDS
Bulletin). Or they can occur through the forging of
alliances between societal actors representing the
poor and sympathetic reformists/groups within the
state. Or they can occur when reformists leave public
agencies to work with collective actors in civil society
(as in the case of the demands for the Right to
Information campaign in India – see Pande, this IDS
Bulletin).
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Table 1 Mapping citizen participation in the exercise of public authority
Deliberative institutions (decision-making)
Strong* Weak (ineffective, 
unrepresentative)
Social accountability Strong Governance Councils, Brazil Citizen report cards
institutions (monitoring) (health, education, etc.) Right to information
Expenditure tracking
Social audits
Weak Participatory budgeting, Brazil
(selective inclusion, Participatory planning, Kerala, India
co-optation?) Bhagidari, Delhi, India
*Strong and weak refers to the degree of participation, rather than the outcomes of such participation.
3.2 Class alliances: synergy or antagonism?
Another axis along which one needs to distinguish
social accountability mechanisms from traditional
mechanisms is the tension between the
representativeness of traditional forms of political
accountability (elections), in which each citizen gets a
vote, and the potential narrowness of social
accountability that offers access to those that have
the resources to mobilise and use the media and the
judiciary (Przeworski 2006). These tensions are
highlighted in arenas such as social sector
programmes where the middle class can mobilise to
gain access and dominate the agenda in participatory
institutions, sometimes crowding out the collective
action of the poor (Chakrabarti, this IDS Bulletin).
Middle class citizens can demand accountability from
state institutions for not upholding laws which if
enforced reduces the access of the poor to urban
spaces and resources. The assumption then that
social accountability invariably calls to account the
interests of the ‘broader public’ is in question. The
ways in which social accountability operates in
practice seem important to assessing its potential as
a mechanism for improving services for the poor.
4 The polity approach
While the social accountability framing is promising
for understanding how non-electoral accountability
mechanisms might be used to improve services for
the poor, it does not directly help us understand the
processes through which effective mechanisms for
social accountability come about. Similarly, the work
on direct accountability channels (based on NPM)
accords a central role to citizen action for
improvements in government performance. Yet it
too does not highlight conditions under which
citizens are likely to mobilise and engage in
accountability processes. As argued earlier, there is
no reason to assume that engagement will
automatically follow from the creation of
participatory spaces. To understand how and when
such action emerges, we need to take a long-term
dynamic and mutually constitutive view of state and
society interactions.
The polity approach to social processes is useful for
understanding the conditions under which social
accountability emerges and how it might work
(Skocpol 1992; Mahoney 2000). Analysis of the polity
– the space within which political struggles across
the public–private divide take place and through
which both state and societal capacities and natures
are shaped – are central to understanding failures
(and potential successes) of service delivery reforms.
The approach, ‘views the polity as the primary locus
of action, yet understands political activities, whether
carried on by politicians or by social groups, as
conditioned by the institutional configurations of
governments and political party systems’ (Skocpol
1992: 41). As Skocpol (1992: 41) argues, the polity
approach draws attention to four kinds of processes:
(1) the processes of reforms of state institutions;
(2) the impacts of state institutions on collective
actors interested in specific policy arenas; (3) the ‘fit’
between collective actors with specific goals and the
points of access and leverage afforded by political
institutions; and (4) path dependence of policies and
social action.
What this implies for collective action and public
policy is that the formative moments of reforms
matter. Collective actors who are able to engage in
the reform process are able to ‘engineer fit’ between
the reforms and their own capacities (Houtzager
2003; Gurza Lavalle et al. 2005). Those that are left
out of the process might find it more difficult to
engage at later stages. The way reforms restructure
state institutions impacts the nature and capacities of
collective actors to participate in policy processes as
well as engage in social accountability. Thus, reforms
are not only important for the impacts they have on
sectoral outcomes (e.g. improved education) but also
for their effects on societal actors.
We can now see how the three broad trends of
state reforms – pluralisation, decentralisation and
institutionalised participation – might impact on the
capacity of collective actors representing the poor to
engage in social accountability. The literature on
collective action and social movements shows that
direct public provisioning can facilitate the
construction of alliances between groups of poor
citizens and reformist professionals within the state
involved in service delivery (Joshi 1999; Tendler 1997;
Fox 1992). These alliances are often forged out of
direct experience with service delivery. The location
of reformist providers within the state can increase
their institutional leverage over policy issues (Watson
1996; Dowbor, this IDS Bulletin). In contrast,
professionals in non-governmental service provision
lack leverage within the state to initiate pro-poor
reforms. When service providers are fragmented
they are driven by market competition and other
interests that can prevent them from responding to
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citizen needs and are difficult targets for large-scale
collective action. The move from monolithic state
provision to decentralised, pluralised provision can
constrain the opportunities for such alliances. Choice
reforms may fragment political actors. In contrast,
institutionalised involvement of collective actors in
the recently emergent new spaces for participation
can create real incentives for beneficiaries to engage
collectively with public officials and policy.
The extent to which state reforms of pluralisation,
decentralisation and participation enable or constrain
collective action is also dependent upon the
entitlements people perceive as having. There is
increasing evidence that shows how universal legal
rights facilitate collective action by the poor (McCann
1998; Pande, this IDS Bulletin). Legal rights create
collective interests that cut across social divisions,
hence making it possible for larger collectivities to
form and mobilise. Collective action around legal
rights also provides a degree of legitimacy to social
accountability actions – a ‘rightfulness’ of one’s claims
– that facilitates alliance building with different
groups and reduces the likelihood of suppression.
5 Re-framing the issues: an agenda for research
What implications do the arguments presented
above have for research? How might research
contribute to a better understanding of the kinds of
reforms that would improve public services as well as
citizen engagement?
First, if we place faith in social accountability
mechanisms to have impacts on public service quality,
we need to understand the conditions under which
collective actors emerge, gain capacity and engage in
social accountability. As argued here, this necessarily
means taking a longer term view to trace the
iterative processes through which networks of
collective actors have evolved over the period of the
policy reform process and how reforms themselves
have shaped the social terrain. The polity approach
helps us do this.
Second, research needs to pay particular attention to
alliances that cut across class lines and across the
public–private divide as these are more likely to
underpin successful cases of social accountability
leading to improvements in services. How these
alliances are shaped and evolve over time will help
throw light on cases of successful reforms.
Finally, there is a greater likelihood that collective
actors who participate in the processes of state
reforms are more likely to directly engage in or
facilitate social accountability at sub-national levels.
We need research on such ‘moments of
opportunity’, through which new social actors
participate in policymaking and forge alliances across
the public–private and class divide to understand the
shape and impact of reforms that follow. Path
dependence matters. In contrast to the view that
autonomy from the state is a key condition of
credible social accountability, engagement is
necessary, as Houtzager (2003) argues, to engineer
an ‘institutional fit’ between reforms and the
capacities of collective actors on the ground.
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